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1. INTRODUCTION
The ever-increasing cost of litigation and the perceived effects
of this cost on limiting access to justice is a perennial concern in
modem society. The rising cost of legal services in general, and
litigation in particular, is often seen somewhat ominously as at
least "a barrier to some and a problem for all litigants."' At first
glance, this emphasis on the cost of legal services seems well
placed. After all, simple intuition tells us that increases in the cost
of legal services seem destined to price low income citizens out of
the market and lead to a decrease in the ability of those citizens to
secure access to justice. However, this Comment will show that
the belief that a relative increase in the price of legal services will
necessarily cause citizens to lose access to legal services is, in fact,
* J.D. Candidate, 2001, University of Pennsylvania Law School; B.S., 1997,
University of Minnesota. I wish to express my gratitude to my parents and
grandparents for being a continuing source of inspiration. I also wish to thank the
Editors and Board of the University of Pennisylvania founial of Intenational Economic
Law for their thoughtful contributions to this Comment.
I David M Trubeck et al, The Cost of Ordinary Litigation, 31 UCLA L REV. 72,
74 (1983). The high cost of litigation has also been referred to as "a cancer eating
at the heart of the administration of justice." THE RIGHT HONouRABLE THE LoiDn
WOOLF, ACCESSTOJUSTICE: INTERUI REPORT ON THE CIWL JUSICE SISTEM IN FGLAND
AND WALES 8 (1995) [hereinafter WOOLF, INTERIM REPORT] (quoting Sir Thomas
Bingham).
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incorrect. This belief arises out of a "fiscal illusion" created by
changes in relative prices of goods and services. The conception
that legal services are quickly becoming unaffordable is at least
somewhat illusory because relative price increases do not neces-
sarily imply decreased access to legal services. Simply stated, soci-
ety can achieve greater abundance of everything, but to do so it
must alter the proportion of income devoted to different goods and
services.2
By way of putting this problem in context, this Comment con-
siders the recent changes made to English civil procedure as part of
the much-anticipated Woolf reforms and asks whether the reforms
will achieve their objective of decreasing the cost of litigation. 3
While the analysis focuses on the new Civil Procedure Rules, a
general result arises that is probably applicable to most legal sys-
tems. In particular, this Comment will show that it is unwise to fo-
cus too much attention on reducing the cost of legal services, ex-
cept insofar as efforts are being made to increase legal
productivity. Efforts to reduce legal costs may indeed lower costs
within the short-term time horizon, but any efforts to reduce the
cost of legal services in the long term will ultimately fail unless the
reforms are specifically addressed to increasing the productivity of
legal services. Moreover, there are certain characteristics of legal
productivity that contain "forces working almost unavoidably for
progressive and cumulative increases in the real costs incurred in
supplying them."4 As a result, it is highly unlikely that the legal
2 William J. Baumol, Health Care, Education, and the Cost Disease: A Looming
Crisis for Public Choice, 77 PuB. CHOICE 17, 23 (1993) [hereinafter Baumol, Health
Care].
3 In 1994, Lord Harry Woolf (now Master of the Roles) was appointed by the
Lord Chancellor to review the rules and procedures in civil courts in England and
Wales and to make appropriate recommendations. The objectives of this review
were, inter alia, to improve access to justice, reduce the cost of litigation, and re-
duce the complexity of the legal process. This review resulted in the publication
of two reports entitled Access to Justice and the Draft Civil Proceedings Rules. See
WOOLF, INTERIM REPORT, supra note 1; THE RIGHT HONOURABLE THE LORD WOOLF,
AccESS TO JUSTICE: DRAFT CIVIL PROCEEDINGS RULEs (1996) [hereinafter WOOLF,
CrvlL PROCEEDINGS RuLEs]. The resulting Rules were finally enacted into law on
December 17, 1998 and are embodied in the Civil Procedure Rules 1998 which
came into force on April 26, 1999. See Civil Procedure Rules 1998, SI 1998/3132
(Sweet & Maxwell 1999) (Eng.).
4 William J. Baumol, Macroeconomics of Unbalanced Growth: The Anatomy of Ur-
ban Crisis, 57 AM. ECON. REv. 415,415 (1967) [hereinafter Baumol, Macroeconomics].
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services will ever experience the kind of productivity increases
necessary to substantially reduce the cost of legal services relative
to the cost of most other goods and services. Nevertheless, it will
be shown that from a social welfare point of view these almost in-
evitable increases in cost need not necessarily affect the ability of
persons to secure legal services.
Section 2 of this Comment sets the stage by describing the re-
cent English attempts at civil procedure reform. As previously
mentioned, this Comment examines the Woolf reforms and the
newly enacted Civil Procedure Rules 1998, noting those new Rules
that most explicitly attempt to control the cost of litigation. Section
3 then introduces the Baumol Hypothesis which provides the theo-
retical framework for the analysis. This analytical framework is
then applied to the Civil Procedure Rules in Section 4, and alterna-
tive suggestions are made as to how litigation costs might be better
controlled. Section 5 presents this Comment's conclusion.
2. THE CIVIL PROCEDURE RULES 1998
("CPR" OR "WOOLF REFORMS")
In 1994, Lord Harry Woolf was appointed by the Lord Chan-
cellor to study the procedures in the civil courts of England and
Wales and to recommend changes that would improve the opera-
tion of the civil justice system s This four year inquiry was wide-
ranging and finally resulted in over 300 recommendations de-
signed to decrease the cost and complexity of civil litigation.' Lord
Woolf's inquiry produced two interim publications that detailed
his findings,7 and many of his recommendations were codified in
the subsequent Civil Procedure Rules 1998.8 These Civil Procedure
Rules took effect on April 26, 1999, amid much speculation and
hope that they would help reign in spiraling costs, delay, and
complexity of the English system of civil justice.9 The new system
5 See WOOLF, INTERm REPORT, supra note 1.
6 See THE RIGHT HONOURABLE THE LORD WOOLF, AccLss TO JUSTICE: FINAL
REPORT TO THE LORD CHANCELLOR ON THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTE.1 IN ENGLAND AND
WALES (1996) [hereinafter WOOLF, FINAL REPORT].
7 See WOOLF, INTERIM REPORT, supra note 1; WOOLF, FINAL REPORT, supra note
6.
8 See generally Civil Procedure Rules, (1998) SI 1998/3132 (Sweet & Maxwell
1999).
2001]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
has not been without detractors 0 but, by and large, the reforms
have been met with a great deal of optimism."
A primary concern of the Woolf reforms, as they came to be
known, was that "[e]xcessive cost[s] deter people from making or
defending claims." 12 In particular, "[a] number of businesses [say]
that it is often cheaper to pay up, irrespective of the merits, than to
defend an action. For individual litigants the unaffordable cost of
litigation constitutes a denial of access to justice."13 These concerns
were reflected in the "overriding objective" of the Civil Procedure
Rules 1998, which is simply to construe the civil procedure system
so as to deal with cases justly.'4
2.1. Overriding Objective of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998
The overriding objective is the lens through which the entire
Civil Procedure Rules must be viewed.15 Simply put, the overrid-
ing objective is that the system of civil procedure must be con-
strued in such a manner as to enable the court to deal with cases
9 It would not be an overstatement to say that the more than 300 changes
suggested by Lord Woolf gave rise to the most radical change to English civil pro-
cedure in the past 100 years. Despite such extraordinary changes, the Woolf Re-
forms were generally met with a great amount of optimism. See Terence Shaw,
Reforms to Make Justice More Civil, DAILY TELEGRAPH, July 27,1996, at 12; Simona de
Logu, Shake-up of UK Civil Courts Announced, UPI, June, 16,1995, available at LEXIS,
U.S. News Library, Combined File. Most English lawyers seemed to recognize
that something needed to be done to decrease costs although there was relatively
little agreement about how to fix the problem. See Lord Harry Woolf, Civil Justice
in the United Kingdom, 45 An J. CoMw. L. 709, 711-13 (1997) [hereinafter Woolf,
Civil Justice]; Fixed Costs: Wool/s Achilles Heel?, LAw., Oct. 8, 1996, at 13, available at
LEXIS, News Library, Lawyer File.
10 Quote of the Week, LAW., Sept 11, 2000, available at http://
www.thelawyer.co.uk (quoting Gordon Pollock QC as declaring, "I just think that
the whole thing [the Woolf reforms] is a complete waste of time."). Professor Mi-
chael Zander was among the most outspoken of the critics, arguing that the solu-
tions offered by Lord Woolf were likely to make matters worse. Martin Mears,
The High Cost of Letting Woolf Through the Doors, TiMES (London), Nov. 7, 2000, at
Law.
11 Michael Zander, Woolf Report in Sheep's Clothing, TIMES (London), Aug. 6,
1996, at Law (noting that "Woolf... represents current political correctness.").
12 WOOLF, INTERIM REPORT, supra note 1, at 9.
13 Id.
14 Civil Procedure Rule 1.1.
15 See id. 1.3.1 (stating that the overriding objective "provides a compass to
guide courts and litigants and legal advisors as to their general course").
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justly. 6 Specifically this means that, so far as practical, the court
must attempt to: (1) place the parties on an equal footing; (2) save
expense; (3) deal with the case in ways which are proportionate to
the amount of money involved, the importance of the case, com-
plexity of the issues, and the financial position of the parties; (4)
ensure that the case is dealt with expeditiously and fairly; and (5)
allot to the case an appropriate share of the court's resources while
keeping in mind the necessity of allotting other resources to other
casesj 7 It is important to note that most of these guidelines di-
rectly address the cost of the litigation before the court. Also ad-
dressed in the CPR is the issue of delay, which acts as drag or fric-
tion upon the economy by reducing the ability of individuals and
corporations to increase productivity and fully utilize capital. The
costs incurred in delay are difficult to quantify and are somewhat
more abstract than costs that are more directly related to the litiga-
tion process.
2.2. Noteworthy Changes to English Civil Procedure
The Civil Procedure Rules enacted many important and novel
changes that revolutionized English civil procedure.18 Indeed, the
Woolf reforms did "not 'tinker' with the existing system; they [re-
wrote] it."19 While many, if not most, of these changes are de-
signed to reduce the complexity and cost of litigation (in keeping
with the overriding objective),20 it is most instructive to focus at-
tention on a few of the most noticeable changes. Therefore, rather
than analyze each particular element of the Civil Procedure Rules,
this Comment will focus on those rules relating to discovery, the
awarding of costs, and case management. I believe that the
changes to these elements of English civil procedure are the most
important and will have the most far-reaching effect.
16 See id. 1.1(1).
17 Id. 1.1.
18 See id. 1.0.2 (stating that the Civil Procedure Rules 1993 have no equivalent
in the prior rules and that their principal purpose is to signal a substantial shift in
the manner in which cases are handled).
19 Richard Highley, Wowlesale Canges to the English Civil Justice System Go into
Effect, 66 DEF. CouNs. J. 334,334 (1999).
20 See supra Section 2.1.
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2.2.1. Discovery
"From the outset of the consultation process that led to the
Woolf reforms it was clear that issues relating to discovery were
seen as critical to an updated civil litigation system."21 The objec-
tive was to limit discovery rather than to expand and Americanize
it.22 In particular, there was dissatisfaction with the prior Peruvian
Guano test23 that had previously been used to determine the range
of discoverable material.24
The result of the Peruvian Guano decision was to make virtually
unlimited the range of potentially relevant (and therefore discov-
erable) documents, which parties and their lawyers are obliged to
review and list, and which the other side is obliged to read, against
the knowledge that only a handful of such documents will affect
the outcome of the case. In that sense it is a monumentally ineffi-
cient process, especially in the larger cases. The more conscien-
tiously it is carried out, the more inefficient it is.25
This decision to move toward restricted discovery was due, in
part, to the effect of market forces operating upon the English
courts.26 In the years leading up to the Woolf reforms, commercial
organizations were effectively shopping around for the least ex-
pensive venue to bring an action, and expansive discovery was
causing these firms to take their commercial litigation elsewhere.27
Indeed, Lord Woolf explicitly stated such factors as support for
21 Gordon Exall, Civil Litigation Brief. Woolf Reforms (18), 143 SoLIc. J. 490
(1999).
22 See generally WOOLF, INTERIM REPORT, supra note 1, at 164-74.
23 Compagnie Financiere et Commerciale du Pacifique v. Peruvian Guano
Co., 1882 Q.B. 55 (Eng. C.A.).
24 WOOLF, INTERIM REPORT, supra note 1, at 167; see also Woolf, Civil Justice, su-
pra note 9, at 711 (stating that "[t]he scale of discovery, at least in the larger cases,
is completely out of control.").
25 WOOLF, INTERIM REPORT, su ra note 1, at 167; see also Woolf, Civil Justice, su-
pra note 9, at 711 (asserting that "[t]he principle of full, candid disclosure in the
interests of justice has been devalued because discovery is pursued without suffi-
cient regard to economy and efficiency in terms of the usefulness of the informa-
tion which is likely to be obtained from the documents disclosed.").
26 See Woolf, Civil Justice, supra note 9, at 715 (noting that the costs of com-
mercial and patent litigation influence where international entities resolve their
legal disputes).
27 See id.
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limiting discovery.28 Arguing that "the costs of conducting litiga-
tion in the Commercial Court [was] totally beyond reason" and
that commercial organizations may change venue to New York,
Lord Woolf believed that civil procedure reform in general, and re-
form of discovery in particular, was a matter of importance to the
national economy.29 If true, this is a powerful statement regarding
the high cost of litigation.
It can hardly be doubted that this concern over discovery is
partly due to a desire to protect personal privacy. 0 Yet the eco-
nomic cost of searching for relevant documents pursuant to a dis-
covery request and giving depositions must not be underesti-
mated. Discovery operates not only as a drag on the economy by
directly impacting the business operations of the litigants, but it
also operates as a drag on the judicial system by increasing the
burden on the courts.
2.2.2. Costs
"Several long established principles relating to legal costs have
either been modified or disappeared completely as a result of the
Woolf reforms, and one or two totally new concepts and proce-
dures have been introduced."31 Most notably, the long-standing
English rule of awarding costs to the winning party has been modi-
fied by the Civil Procedure Rules? 2 While the general rule still re-
mains that the unsuccessful party will be ordered to pay the costs
of the successful party, the Civil Procedure Rules introduced a
number of explicit exceptions.3 3 Also, if the court orders a party to
28 See WOOLF, INTERmi REPoRT, supra note 1, at 164-74.
29 Woolf, Civil Justice, supra note 9, at 715 (explaining that the reduction of
litigation costs "is, therefore, a matter of considerable importance to the City of
London and the economy of the country.").
30 Karen A. Feagle, Extraterritorial Discovery: A Social Con tract Perspectiue, 7
DuKE J. CoMP. & INT'L L 297, 299 (1997) (noting that most countries outside the
United States place strong limitations on discovery to protect privacy interests).
31 Michael Bacon, Civil Litigation Brief. Woolf Reforns (27), 143 Sour- J. 740,740
(1999).
32 See Civil Procedure Rule 44.3.1 (commenting that "[a]lthough this rule pre-
serves the general rule that the unsuccessful party will be ordered to pay the costs
of the successful party, Lord Woolf M.I was anxious to move away from the po-
sition that any success is sufficient to obtain an order for costs.").
33 See Civil Procedure Rule 44.3 (stating when a court has discretion with re-
spect to the allocation of costs).
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pay the costs of another, it may require some amount to be paid on
account before the costs are assessed.34 "This, coupled with the
ability to order costs or a proportion of costs which have been
summarily assessed to be paid within 14 days has established in
today's litigation system a concept of what one learned commen-
tator has described as 'a pay as you go' system for costs."35 This
"pay as you go" system may have a significant impact upon the
behavior of the parties. In particular, such a system may create in-
centives for settlement by making the parties immediately inter-
nalize their costs and make a calculated decision as to whether
their expected marginal revenue exceeds their expected marginal
costs.
3 6
"A major development in the approach of district judges to
costs in the last decade has been a determination to ascertain the
levels of solicitors' overheads, to fix local remuneration rates ac-
cordingly and to let those rates be known."37 Accordingly, costs
for relatively simple actions are, for the first time in civil litigation
in England, fixed and specified in the Civil Procedure Rules ac-
cording to the value of the claim.38 Subject to limited exceptions,
"[t]he court may not award more or less than the amount shown in
the table."39 Despite the ambitious goal of clarifying costs, there is
a developing realization that "costs are at the moment something
of a mess."40 Indeed, there seems to be little hope that fixed costs
are really an antidote for the increasing cost of litigation. There are
often too many variables that must be taken account of to deter-
mine the amount of costs that should be awarded to a party.41 In
34 Id. 44.3(8).
35 Bacon, supra note 31, at 741.
36 See HAL R. VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMIcS: A MODERN APPROACH
435 (3d ed. 1993) (noting the standard logic that "if the marginal revenue of some
action didn't equal the marginal cost of that action, then it would pay.., to
change the action.").
37 Richard Holloway, Costs and the Civil Procedure Rules, 143 SOLIC. J. 316, 316
(1999).
3s See Civil Procedure Rule 46.2; see also Bacon, supra note 31, at 740 (ex-
plaining the amount of costs that may be awarded in relatively simple fast track
cases).
39 Civil Procedure Rule 46.2(2).
40 Holloway, supra note 37, at 316.
41 See Fixed Costs: Woolfs Adhilles Heel?, supra note 9 (noting that fixed costs in
personal injury cases could be unfair to the plaintiff due to variations in costs and
time).
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particular, the length of a trial is often unpredictable and it may be
nearly impossible to account for all the variations in cost that arise
simply from the location of the trial. 42
Similarly, Part 45 of the Civil Procedure Rules sets out a de-
tailed listing of fixed costs which become applicable where, inter
alia, the claim is for a specified sum of money and a judgment in
default, admission, or summary judgment is obtained 43 Thus, for
example, where the amount of the judgment exceeds £5000 and
where summary judgment is given, the cost is £210,44 plus some
similarly specified sum for commencement of the claim.4 5
2.2.3. Case Management
The Civil Procedure Rules classify cases into three distinct
types for the purpose of case management small claims, fast track,
and multi-track.4 6 These classifications are somewhat similar to the
various case tracks that have been experimented with and utilized
in the United States. In fact, this method of case management was
developed by looking to the experience that U.S. courts had with
similar classification systems.47
The fast track, for example, includes those claims that have a
financial value more than £5,000 but not greater than £15,000 and
otherwise do not fit the criteria for the Small Claims track.48 The
fast track comprises those cases that concern some landlord-tenant
issues or claims for personal injuries where the financial value of
the claim exceeds £1,000 but is not more than £5,000. 49 It exists in
order to make litigation "more affordable, more predictable, and
more proportionate to the value and complexity of individual
42 See Holloway, supra note 37, at 316.
43 Civil Procedure Rule 45.1(2).
44 Id. 45.4(b).
45 Id. 45.2-
46 Id. Part 26.
47 See John Heaps & Kathryn Taylor, The Abuser Pays: The Control of Utnwvar-
ranted Discovery, 41 N.Y.L SCI L REV. 615, 617 (1997) (stating that "some of the
problems, and indeed solutions such as case management proposed by Lord
Woolf, will sound familiar to U.S. lawyers.").
4s Civil Procedure Rule 26.6(4).
49 Id. 26.6.
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cases."5 0 Another fast track feature is "speed and the virtually sac-
rosanct status of the trial date."51
The multi-track comprises all cases that do not otherwise meet
the criteria for small claims or fast track 52 The multi-track includes
"a spectrum of cases from the relatively straightforward to cases
which are complex, weighty, of high financial value or of signifi-
cant public interest " 53
The issues of case management and costs are closely related
and intertwined 5 4 Indeed, "[p]rocedural judges are to take ac-
count of the parties' financial circumstances in allocating cases to
the fast track or to the small claims jurisdiction."5s Moreover, the
"[l]imited procedures and tight timetables on the fast track, and
judicial case management on the multi-track, will make it more dif-
ficult for wealthier parties to gain a tactical advantage over their
opponents by additional expenditure."5 6
3. THE BAUMOL HYPoTHESIs
In 1966, William Baumol and William Bowen hypothesized that
the chronic problem of cumulative cost increases in the performing
arts was due (at least in significant part) to the fact that the per-
forming arts typically experience few or mild increases in produc-
tivity over time.57 Later termed the "cost disease of the personal
services," Professor Baumol's has hypothesis has been extended to
health care, education, and other "stagnant" components of the
service sector.58 Each of these "stagnant" sectors of the economy
possess a basic underlying criterion - they are all sectors in which
50 Woolf, Civil Justice, supra note 9, at 723.
51 Gordon Exall, Civil Litigation Brief. Woolf Reforms (24), 143 SoUc. J. 640, 641
(1999).
52 See Civil Procedure Rule 26.6(6).
53 WOOLF, INTERIM REPORT, supra note 1, at 48.
,4 See Civil Procedure Rule 44.2.1 (citing Lord Woolf's view that litigation be-
came so expensive because the client was not aware of the costs incurred, and that
this problem could be cured by obliging the solicitor "to inform the client when-
ever an adverse costs order is made.").
55 See Woolf, Civil Justice, supra note 9, at 724.
56 Id.
57 See WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & WILLIAM G. BowEN, PERFORMING ARTs - THE
EcONoMIc DILEMMA (1966).
58 See Baunol, Health Care, supra note 2, at 19-20.
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the human touch is of the essence.5 9 The human touch may be re-
quired because of either real or perceived differences in the output
that is produced. Other typically cited personal services suscepti-
ble to the cost disease are automotive repair, automotive insurance,
and postal services.60
Although the Baumol Hypothesis has not yet been explicitly
extended to legal services, there is substantial reason to believe that
legal services also possess characteristics that are inherently resis-
tant to productivity increases and therefore inherently susceptible
to cost increases.6' This is plausible for several reasons. First, it is
virtually impossible to standardize a lawyer's methods of produc-
tion. Outwardly similar legal problems often require subtlety dif-
ferent solutions. There is a certain amount of "art" involved in ne-
gotiating or persuading a judge, jury, or opposing party that a
particular outcome is appropriate. For better or worse, the work
performed by a lawyer is too complex and dependent upon par-
ticular factual circumstances to reduce it to a simple algorithm.
Second, it is likely that, within limits, clients would prefer that
their lawyers spend at least some minimum amount of time on
their case. There also may be a perceived correlation of quality
with the amount of labor that the lawyer applies to the legal prob-
lem. If the perceived correlation of quality with labor input varies
from the true correlation, this will inhibit productivity growth
where it might otherwise occur. To the extent that it exists, this
perceived correlation of quality with labor expenditure creates a
lower bound on the cost of legal services.
59 This dependence on the human touch may arise for different reasons. The
method of producing the service may be so varied as to preclude standardization,
or the consumer may prefer that the service not be standardized. There is suffi-
cient variation in the characteristics of legal problems such that assembly-line le-
gal analysis is not a viable solution. See William J. Baumol, Productivity Policy
and the Service Sector, Discussion Paper #1 (1984) (unpublished manuscript, on
file with the Fishman-Davidson Center for the Study of the Service Sector) [here-
inafter Baumol, Productivity Policy].
60 See Baumol, Health Care, supra note 2, at 19.
61 Foreshadowing this Comment, it has interestingly been suggested that, at
least within the United States, access to legal services may soon present the same
public policy problems as access to health care. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Would
British Fixes Improve U.S. Justice?, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 28,1997, at A21. However, there
have been attempts to standardize some of the simpler legal services. See "Fast-
Food" Legal Services, USA TODAY (Newsletter Edition), Dec. 1996, at 16.
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Third, and particularly applicable to the English system of jus-
tice, is the problem of duplication of labor. In England, solicitors
"conventionally prepare the cases, and barristers... undertake the
advocacy in court."62 This duplication of labor between solicitor
and barrister may compound the problem of resistance to produc-
tivity increases. Although the division between solicitors and bar-
risters is becoming blurred, there remains a very real distinction.
At least partly due to the "strict experience and training tests ap-
plied,"63 the inefficient division of labor creates a barrier to in-
creased productivity. This is a built-in inefficiency.
3.1. Concept of the "Stagnant" Service Sector
Strictly for the purpose of developing a basic theory, the Bau-
mol Hypothesis assumes that the economy may be divided into
two distinct groups. These two groups may be thought to consist
of "technologically progressive activities in which innovations,
capital accumulation, and economies of large scale all make for a
cumulative rise in output per man hour and activities which, by
their very nature, permit only sporadic increases in productivity."64
For convenience, these two groups are referred to as the produc-
tive sector and the stagnant sector, respectively.
Automobile manufacturing is one of the most obvious exam-
ples of economic activity within the productive sector. Like most
manufacturing processes, automobile manufacturing has the goal
of producing some end product, with little concern as to how that
product is produced.65 In other words, assuming that the price of
the manufactured good remains constant, the consumer does not
care how much labor was expended in producing it. "Thus it has
been possible, as it were, behind the scenes, to effect successive and
cumulative decreases in the labor input coefficient for most manu-
factured goods, often along with some degree of improvement in
the quality of the product."66
62 Suzanne Bur, The Civil Justice Reforms in England and Wales: Will Lord Woolf
Succeed Where Others Have Failed?, 17 WINDSOR Y.B. OF ACCEss TO JUsT. 221, 228
(1999).
63 Id.
64 Baumol, Macroeconomics, supra note 4, at 415-16.
65 See id. at 416.
6Id.
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In contrast to the productive sector, the stagnant service sector
may best be defined as those economic activities "in which quality
is highly correlated with labor-time expended, and in which fre-
quently (but not always) there must be direct contact between the
consumers and those who provide the labor."67 Stagnant service
sectors are typically economic activities in which "for all practical
purposes the labor is itself the end product"68 The stagnant serv-
ice sector is often also associated with the difficulty in standardiz-
ing the product, as well as a perceived positive correlation between
labor time expenditure and the quality of the product.69 Legal
services share many of these characteristics and therefore may ap-
propriately be categorized as a "stagnant service."
For an extreme example of a stagnant service consider the per-
formance of a Mozart quartet scored for thirty minutes. This hy-
pothetical quartet "took two person-hours to perform in the 18th
century and requires exactly the same amount of performer-time
today." 70 Not only is the human touch an essential element of the
performance, but "[t]he loss of quality that would result from an
attempt to speed up the performance is obvious enough!"'
Although some personal services are herein described as
"stagnant," it is not implied that such sectors never experience
growth in productivity. Rather, productivity growth in stagnant
sectors is more likely to occur in discrete bursts rather than a per-
sistent trend, as one might expect in manufacturing." Consider,
for example, the discrete increase in productivity made possible by
the advent of computerized legal research tools. Prior to electronic
databases, attorneys had to sort through various reporters and di-
gests in order to find legal precedent This was naturally a very la-
bor-intensive process and subject to a large degree of potential er-
ror. With the advent of electronic databases, attorneys no longer
needed to devote as much labor input to legal research. Moreover,
it is quite likely that there was a contemporaneous improvement in
67 Baumol, Productivity Policy, supra note 59, at 3.
63 Baumol, Macroeconomics, stqra note 4, at 416.
69 See Baumol, Productivity Policy, supra note 59, at 3. It seems very plausible
that legal services match these criteria very well.
70 JC
71 Id.
72 See Baumol, Macroeconwrnics, supra note 4, at 416-17; Baumol, Productivity
Policy, supra note 59, at 11-12
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the quality of the legal research that they were producing.73 This
productivity increase was, more or less, a single event rather than
an ongoing process. This is not to say that future productivity in-
creases will not occur - they surely will. Rather, the point to bear
in mind is that within stagnant sectors one would not expect to
find continuously increasing productivity to the extent found in
other sectors of the economy.74 Instead, one would expect to see
discrete bursts of productivity increases followed by longer peri-
ods of relatively stable productivity.75 The difference in produc-
tivity growth between the productive sectors and the stagnant
sectors is "a matter of degree rather than an absolute dichotomy." 76
Admittedly, the real world provides examples of activities that
do not fall into such neat classifications. Some manufacturing pro-
cesses possess the characteristics of both productive and stagnant
industries. For the purposes of the present (and rather rudimen-
tary) analysis, these hybrid activities will be ignored.
3.2. Mathematical Derivation of the Baumol Hypothesis
Beyond the basic underlying assumption of the separability of
economic activities into productive and stagnant sectors, the cost
disease model utilizes three other assumptions. First, and most
important, the model assumes that wages in the two sectors of the
economy go up and down together. This is a fairly realistic as-
sumption because "[i]n the long run there is some degree of mo-
bility in all labor markets and consequently, while wages in one
activity can lag behind those in another, unless the former is in
process of disappearing altogether we cannot expect the disparity
to continue indefinitely." 77 Therefore, for simplicity of the model,
hourly wages are assumed to be precisely the same, though the
model could easily be modified to provide for a more realistic sce-
nario.78 Second, the model assumes that expenses other than the
cost of labor are nonexistent. This is obviously an unrealistic as-
73 See David Ranii, For this Firm, the Future is Now, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 24, 1983,
at 1.
74 This is, of course, true by definition of a stagnant service sector.
75 See Baumol, Macroeconomics, supra note 4, at 416-17.
76 Id.
77 Id. at 417.
78 See id.
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sumption, but it is useful because it simplifies the mathematical
model.79 Finally, the model assumes that money wages rise as
rapidly as output per man-hour in the productive sector.80 While
there may be some reality in this assumption, it is nevertheless
rather inessential to the model.$' This assumption would affect
only the magnitude of the absolute price level but would not affect
the relative costs and prices that will be shown to be most impor-
tant to the model.82
The Baumol Hypothesis can be easily described mathematically
by assuming a two sector economy composed of a stagnant legal
services sector and a productive manufacturing sector.S3
Let
Y, = units of output of legal services
Y2 = units of output of manufactured goods
L, = labor input in legal services sector
L 2 = labor input in manufacturing sector.
Assuming that the output of legal services per man hour grows
at a constant rate and that the output of manufactured goods per
man hour grows at some constant compounded rate, r, then for
some constants a and b, the output at any particular time t may be
described by: 4
(1) Y(f) = aLc0
(2) Y2(t) = bL2(oert .
79 See id.
80 See Baunol, Macroeconomics, supra note 4, at 417.
81 See id.
82 See id.
83 There is no inherent difficulty with such an assumption. Although for
conceptual purposes the economy is divided into a legal services sector and a
manufacturing sector, it is not necessary to so limit the model. One can also di-
vide the economy into a legal services sector and some other sector encompassing
all other sectors in the aggregate sense.
84 See Baumol, Macroeconomics, sirra note 4, at 417.
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Essentially, equation (1) specifies (by assumption) that the out-
put of the stagnant service sector grows in fixed proportion to the
amount of labor unit input. In other words, equation (1) simply
states that the marginal product of labor is equal to some constant
a. On the other hand, equation (2) describes a productive sector of
the economy in which the output over time grows at an ever-
increasing rate with respect to the unit labor input. In other words,
equation (2) simply states that the marginal product of labor is
constantly increasing as a function of t.5
While it may be somewhat artificial to assume a two-sector
model in which one sector produces at some constant output per
man hour and the other sector grows at a constant (rather than
fluctuating) rate, it is not so far abstracted from reality as to lose in-
structive value.86 It is often necessary in economic analysis to peel
away the layers of complicating variables in order to understand
the overarching implications.87
Now, assuming that all workers are homogeneous, all jobs are
equally attractive to workers, and that the labor market is perfectly
competitive, then all workers will receive precisely the same wage
rate.88 Once again, these are simplifying, standard assumptions
present in many economic models.89 Assuming that wages are
equal across all sectors of the economy and that wages grow at the
same constant compounded rate r as the labor productivity in the
manufacturing sector,90 then for some constant W at time t, wages
across the economy may be described by:
(3) W(f) = Wer..
85 The marginal product of labor is the first derivative of the production
function.
86 See Baumol, Macroeconomics, supra note 4, at 415-16.
87 See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, The Nature of Man, J. APPLIED
CORP. FIN., Summer 1994, at 4,4 (arguing that a limited number of variables sim-
plifies social science models to allow for greater understanding).
88 CAMPBELL R. MCCONNELL, ECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES, PROBLEMS, AND POLICIES
661 (12th ed. 1993).
89 See DENNIS W. CARLTON & JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL
ORGANIZATION 86-88 (2d ed. 1994).
90 Wages theoretically increase in lockstep with increases in labor productiv-
ity because wages are determined by the marginal productivity of labor. See
MARK BLAUG, THE METHODOLOGY OF ECONOMICS 193-201 (1980).
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This equation requires some explanation. First, labor produc-
tivity is simply shorthand for describing the marginal productivity
of labor at a particular point along the production function. Sec-
ond, because we had earlier assumed that workers in this model
were homogeneous, indifferent between jobs, and that the labor
market was perfectly competitive, we can expect that the wage rate
in both the productive and stagnant sectors will correspond with
W(.
Because the cost of a unit of output in this simplified economy
is equal to the total wages paid in that sector divided by units of
output,91 it follows that the cost per unit of output in the legal
services sector, CI(t), may be described by:
(4) C~f = [ffWt)Ll(t) 1=WeL4(,) 1- We'
[_1t) cdL CL( 1) J a
(5) C2= 
I IL(t bL,(,)e't  b
Taking the limit yields:
(6) lim Cl(t) = lim We 00
(7) tiM.C2(t) = liM W =W
S) (t ) -_cb b
Essentially, equation (6) illustrates that the per-unit cost of the
output of the stagnant service sector will increase without bound
over time. Conversely, equation (7) illustrates that the per-unit
cost of goods in the productive sector of the economy will remain
constant over time.
Because of the mobility of labor, wages throughout the econ-
omy will tend to rise at approximately the same rate (therefore
91 This is the case simply because the model assumes no other costs of pro-
duction besides wages.
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constantly tending toward a uniform economy-wide wage rate).92
To the extent that workers in the stagnant service sector produce
less output per hour than the workers in the more productive sec-
tors of the economy, but the cost of labor input is equal across the
economy, the per unit cost of the stagnant service sector output
will reflect this difference as a relatively higher price.93 Moreover,
because the differential between unit cost in the two sectors is in-
creasing over time, stagnant service sector output will continu-
ously become more expensive relative to productive sector output.
While it is important to note that no single influence accounts
for the entire increase in the personal services sector, it is likely that
the cost disease has had a significant effect.94
3.3. Application of the Baumol Hypothesis
Even if it were true that productivity in the stagnant services
was not increasing one iota, their rising prices could still not put
them beyond the reach of the community; on the contrary, it would
remain true that society could afford ever more of them, just as it
has in fact been getting ever more of the health care and education
that seem to grow steadily toward becoming too expensive to af-
ford. 95
Indeed, as long as productivity does not actually decline in any
sector, individuals will be able to achieve at least the same amount
of every good and service, regardless of price level.96 More intui-
tively, these simple productivity increases result in the growth of
the total economic pie. Taken out of the abstract and applied to the
legal services sector of the economy, it follows that so long as pro-
ductivity within the legal services sector is not declining, society
will likely be able to consume as much legal services as it did the
year before.
92 This assumption of a uniform wage rate across the economy is nonessen-
tial. Even given a wage differential between the sectors, one would still expect
long run nominal wages to increase everywhere. See Baumol, Health Care, supra
note 2, at 20-21.
93 Assuming a competitive market, price is equal to the marginal cost of the
good or service. See VARIAN, supra note 36, at 374.
94 Baumol, Health Care, supra note 2, at 19.
95 Id. at 23.
96 See id.
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In terms of developing a procedural system designed to lower
the cost of legal services, lawmakers should focus on increasing
productivity rather than simply attempting to force reduction in
costs by limiting cost awards or restricting discovery. It is the low
productivity of legal services, relative to the rest of the economy,
that has the greatest potential for chronic increase in cost. How-
ever, to the extent that the increase in cost does not necessarily
mean that society is worse off, it is appropriate that lawmakers fo-
cus on restricting discovery and creating more effective case man-
agement techniques.
3.4. The Rebuttal to Baumol
Although there has not been significant debate disputing the
basic cost disease hypothesis, there has been some discussion as to
the relative significance of the cost disease as a factor in rising
costs. Yet, while the exact magnitude of these effects has been the
subject of some controversy, it appears to be accepted by the eco-
nomic community that the role of the cost disease is at least a very
significant, if not dominant, factor.
In an empirical study of the cost disease with respect to the cost
of government services, Professors J. Stephen Ferris and Edwin G.
West determined that approximately two-thirds of the rise in cost
from 1959 to 1989 is attributable to relatively slow productivity
growth, while the remaining one-third is due to changes in real
wages across sectors. 97 This means that "the relative productivity
hypothesis (i.e., Baumol's cause of the cost disease hypothesis) is
not sufficient, in itself, to explain fully past movements in meas-
ured real cost"9S If these results are accurate, and if they carry
over to the legal service sector, we must look to other means to
fully address the problem of rising legal costs - and this implies
that some restructuring of the legal system in terms of procedure
may be appropriate. This may be especially relevant for those legal
systems that are experiencing massive growth in the real wage rate
among lawyers, such as the United States.99 In these countries, one
97 J. Stephen Ferris & Edwin G. West, The Cost Disease and Government Grazuth:
Qualifications to Baumol, 89 PuB. CHOICE 35,36,50 (1996).
9s Id. at43.
SArjen van Witteloostuijn, Mid ad DuikerlEy The Jobless Econony?, 21 OG.
STUD. 312 (2000) (book review) (noting Dunkerley's revelation that the real wages
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would naturally expect the cost disease component of the rise in
cost of legal services to be proportionally smaller and hence, the
impact of procedural restructuring may bring significant benefits.
The criticism by Professors Ferris and West points out a defi-
ciency in the assumption that relative wage rates across both sec-
tors of the simplified economy do not change. This is a a legitimate
criticism of the Baumol Hypothesis. Because "changes in meas-
ured relative costs depend upon changes in relative wages as well
as changes in relative productivity,"measured relative prices are
not necessarily attributable to differing rates of productivity
growth.100 For instance, "real wages can differ across sectors either
because competitive markets pay heterogeneous workers wage dif-
ferentials that reflect individual productivity differences.., or be-
cause differences in the degree of competition across sectors are re-
flected in the returns realized by different (otherwise
homogeneous) labor groups."OI Changes in relative wages will af-
fect social welfare only when the change is a result of changes in
the differential reflecting individual productivity differences.102
Conceding the validity of such criticism does not diminish the
fact that the cost disease hypothesis has plausible validity, yet be-
cause of the uncertainty as to the exact magnitude it is important to
test it empirically.10 3 The most damaging criticism of the hypothe-
sis does not deny the presence of the cost disease, but rather the
magnitude of the cost increases attributable to it. In light of these
facts, the cost disease model remains useful at least insofar as it has
been empirically shown to account for a substantial amount of cost
increases in stagnant service sectors.
4. WHAT THIS MEANS FOR THE CIVIL PROCEDURE RULES
One should recognize that "anticipatory resignation about the
prospects for productivity growth is hardly justified." 1 4 Efficiency
gains are beneficial and should, of course, be encouraged. How-
of lawyers over the period from 1983 to 1993 have grown by an average annual
percentage rate of 29.7).
10o Ferris & West, supra note 97, at 39.
1(o Id.
102 See id.
103 See id. at 50.
104 Baumol, Productivity Policy, supra note 59, at 14.
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ever, because continuous productivity growth is unlikely, it is im-
portant not to expect that sporadic increases in efficiency will be
enough to sufficiently offset the cost disease.
Generally, an increase in efficiency implies an increase in pro-
ductivity.105 In this sense, one might say that manufacturers are
constantly becoming more efficient by producing more output
with less labor input Legal services are also becoming more effi-
cient by producing more or better quality services utilizing less
attorney input (i.e., "more productive billable hours"). Productiv-
ity increases in the legal services are important in that they increase
the social welfare.106 The cautionary note on which this Comment
is focused is simply that discrete efficiency gains are not enough to
overcome the cost disease. Changes to civil procedure systems
may result in lower costs in the short run, but, in the long run,
momentarily lower costs will be overrun by the cost disease.
This conclusion implies that substantial restructuring of a legal
system may incur more costs than benefits because the restructur-
ing may not ever be able to achieve the goal of significantly re-
ducing costs. Moreover, there is no substantial evidence that legal
services in England have become unaffordable. 107 Of course, there
is certainly anecdotal evidence of increasing legal costs depriving
litigants of access to justice,10s but this anecdotal evidence also fits
the description of the "fiscal illusion" 09 that one would expect to
arise from the cost disease." 0 In fact, at least one commentator has
105 This is fairly clear if one accepts efficiency to mean doing more with the
same.
106 Productivity increases enlarge the production possibilities set, causing an
outward shift in the production possibilities frontier. This consequently expands
the utility possibilities set, causing an outward shift in the utility possibilities
frontier and the potential for greater social welfare (assuming the existence of a
well-behaved welfare function). See VARIAN, suplra note 36, at 519-21,535-39.
107 See Conrad Dehn, Q.C., The Woolf Report:. Against tie Public Intert?, in
REFORM OF CIVIL PROcEDuRE: ESANS ON'Acc-ss TO JurIcE' 149,155 (A.A.S. Zud-
erman & Ross Cranston eds., 1995).
103 See WOOLF, INTE~mi REPORT, supra note 1, at 9 (stating that "[m]any of
those who make their living by conducting litigation accepted ... that they would
not be able to afford their own services if they made the misfortune to get caught
up in legal proceedings.").
109 Baumo], Health Care, supra note 2, at 23.
110 See Baumol, Health Care, supra note 2, at 25-26 (noting that "[i]t will not be
easy to convince the intelligent layperson that, even though the prices of personal
services appear to be rising at a rate that is out of control, in fact the costs of those
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noted that "such anecdotal evidence has been available at least
since [he] began at the bar, and [probably] many decades be-
fore .... ."111 Because the problem does not appear to be attribut-
able to anything but the cost disease, the English civil procedure
reform should not be so focused on decreasing the cost of litiga-
tion. Instead, the English system of justice would be better served
by concentrating more on increasing the quality and productivity
of the civil justice system. This would tend to reduce the impact of
the cost disease in the future.
4.1. The Civil Procedure Rules Should Abandon Notions of Fixed
Costs
Probably the most important change that should be made to
the English system of civil procedure is to abolish the fixed costs
that were introduced by the Woolf reforms.112
[I]f legislatures join the general public in the belief that in-
efficiency and skullduggery are the sources of the rising rela-
tive costs of the services, they may conclude that additional
money spent on them represents good money thrown after
bad. The net result may be that the public is deprived of serv-
ices or condemned to services of poorer quality than they
might really want if they understood the nature and necessity
of their price." 3
In the legal service sector this may possibly lead to procedural re-
forms that reduce the overall quality of the judicial process.
Zeal for civil procedure reform should also be tempered by
recognition that reduction of civil costs may, in the long run, be
overshadowed by the associated inefficiency costs of such reform.
This is particularly important in considering fixed costs to be
awarded to the winning party. The consequences of price-fixing
are well-accepted by economists. It is generally agreed that fixing
prices below the market rate causes production shortages or the
services... are really gradually declining, because of small increases in their labor
productivity.").
1I Conrad Dehn, supra note 107, at 155.
112 See supra Section 2.2.2
13 Baumol, Productivity Policy, supra note 59, at 15-16.
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production of inferior goods or services. On the other hand, fixing
prices above the market rate will likely result in surplus produc-
tion of goods or services. When the court awards costs to a suc-
cessful party, it is in part attempting to place some value on the
lawyer's services."14 In the event that lawyers are virtually guar-
anteed not to recover the full amount of costs necessary to cover
their expenses and receive adequate remuneration, this will create
either a shortage of lawyers willing to participate in the action or a
possible decrease in the quality of legal services provided. Either
possibility will restrict access to justice.
Furthermore, fixed costs are inappropriate when the actual cost
of any particular case is unpredictable, as it is in litigation. Indeed,
litigation is so unpredictable that it has been described as "a gam-
ble.""-5 In fact, researchers have found that within a sample of 119
personal injury cases, solicitors spent anywhere from twenty-four
minutes to fourteen hours on particular cases,116 highlighting the
variance in the cost of litigation. Fixed costs may actually create
incentives for lawyers to spend less time working on a case or de-
cline certain cases altogether when liability is not immediately
clear. Therefore, at least within the subset of personal injury cases,
"[t]he figures indicate that fixed costs... may be unfair to the
plaintiff."117
4.2. Case Management Will Probably Not Reduce Costs in the Long
Run
One of Lord Woolf's most basic recommendations for reform-
ing the civil justice system is the institution of judicial case man-
agement"s As described by Lord Woolf, case management is in-
tended to "tackle not only the cost but also the time taken by cases
to reach a conclusion." 119 To the extent that judicial case manage-
ment is instituted to reduce delay, with such delay considered a
barrier to achieving justice, case management is entirely appropri-
114 See JoHN O'HARE & ROBEFrT N. HELL, CVm LITIGATION 524 (1997).
I's NicHoLAs FRIDD & STEVEN WEDDLE, BASIc PRAcTICE IN COURTs AND
TRIBUNALS 269 (1989).
116 See Fixed Costs: Wool/s Achilles Heel?, supra note 9, at 13.
117 Id.
118 See WOOLF, FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 14 (1996).
119 Id. at 18.
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ate and will likely be fairly effective.120 But to the extent that case
management is instituted to reduce the cost of legal services, it is
unlikely that it will achieve its objective over the long run. In es-
sence, the institution of judicial case management represents a one-
time productivity increase. Accordingly, the Baumol hypothesis
suggests that the immediate (i.e., short run) effect may be lower
costs of obtaining justice, but, over the long run, the cost savings
will evaporate as a direct result of the cost disease.
Caution in implementing case management is highly appropri-
ate. The increased focus on speeding cases through the judicial
process has resulted in claims being handled more quickly (and
therefore at a lower apparent cost), "but the suggestions are that
many claims are being settled when liability has not been fully in-
vestigated."121 If this is in fact the case, one might suspect that the
quality of legal services has actually suffered a decrease in the
wake of the Woolf reforms. The implicit suggestion is that the cost
to consumers has increased rather than decreased, although the in-
creased cost may be camouflaged as an inferior product.
Insofar as case management is intended to promote justice by
encouraging the quick and efficient resolution of disputes, it can
hardly be suggested that it is inappropriate. However, if case
management is instituted with the objective that it will lower the
cost of achieving quick and efficient resolutions, failure to meet
that objective will not be long in coming. Once again, it is impor-
tant to approach legal reform with realistic expectations.
4.3. Discovery Reform Will Not Significantly Reduce Costs in the
Long Run
At least in England, "discovery is often the largest single cost
factor in litigation, both in terms of legal expenses and the diver-
sion of management resources ... ."122 The new Civil Procedure
Rules narrowed the general scope of discoverable documents.123
Of course, if discovery is not necessary to achieve a just resolution
120 See id., supra note 6, at 20 (noting generally positive results from judicial
case management procedures utilized by the United States, Canada, and Austra-
lia).
121 Here to Stay; But at /hat Cost?, POST MAG., Oct. 28, 1999, at 3.
122 Heaps & Taylor, supra note 47, at 629.
123 See generally Civil Procedure Rules Part 31.
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to a claim it should not be permitted. Unnecessary discovery is
obviously nonproductive and costly 24 But if it is the case that dis-
covery tends to increase the quality of legal services, one should
not simply focus upon the marginal cost of additional discovery to
the exclusion of other nonquantifiable considerations. The mar-
ginal cost of the additional discovery cannot be separated from the
question of how much the additional discovery will add to the
quality of legal services. This is a question that can only be dealt
with on an ad hoc basis. The new Rules are therefore appropriate
insofar as they tend to prevent nonessential discovery. Neverthe-
less, judges should be wary not to focus attention on the total cost
of discovery. Instead, judicial scrutiny should be directed toward
whether the additional expected benefit of disclosure equals or ex-
ceeds the expected cost in that particular instance.
More importantly, decreasing the availability of disclosure may
also have the effect of decreasing access to justice. As is apparent
from Baumol's hypothesis, the cost of discovery should be ex-
pected to rise without bounds over time. This by no means implies
that parties will not be able to afford discovery in the future. In-
deed, the Baumol hypothesis suggests that the parties will be able
to afford even greater amounts of discovery, although it will com-
prise an ever-increasing portion of a party's budget Accordingly,
a decrease in access to discovery may in fact do nothing to help the
parties, but may only hurt them by decreasing the availability of
information.
5. CONCLUSION
Legal services fall within a sector of the economy that is pro-
ductively stagnant In contrast to more productive sectors of the
economy (such as manufacturing), legal services do not experience
continuous and cumulative increases in productivity over time.
Rather, when productivity increases occur within the legal services
sector, they tend to occur in discrete jumps. Because productivity
increases in productive sectors of the economy tend to outstrip
productivity increases in the stagnant service sectors, the relative
price of output in the stagnant sector tends to increase dramatically
124 Ironically, the ease of obtaining cheap photocopied documents has, at
least in part, led to the massive expense incurred in litigation. See WOOLF, INTEw.I
REPORT, supra note 1, at 164-65.
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over time. As a result of the inherently "stagnant" nature of the le-
gal services sector, efforts to decrease the nominal cost of legal
services will not have a significant effect upon the long run cost of
legal services.
This is not to suggest that we need not concern ourselves with
questions of efficiency. Finding more efficient, more productive
ways of conducting legal services in general, and civil litigation in
particular, remains very important objectives. Nevertheless, it is
important to realize the limits of reform within legal services. It
has been the objective of this Comment to show that despite the
best efforts of past, present, or future reformers, the cost of litiga-
tion will rise over time without bounds. However, this increase in
the relative price of legal services does not mean that parties have
less access to justice. Accordingly, it is not appropriate to focus
attention exclusively upon decreasing the cost of litigation. Rather,
reform should focus upon improving the productivity of the legal
service sector. It is only increased productivity that can signifi-
cantly decrease the relative price of legal services.
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